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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN TH~~ MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM PAXMAN,
Deceased.

!

Case
No.10565

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATE TAX CO·MMISSION
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Fifth Judicial District Court, Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge.
The question which appellant State Tax Commission
presents to the Court for review is whether or not the
decedent, William Paxman, in his will dated May 23,
1944, designated the testamentary provisions therein in
favor of his wife, Vivian T. Paxman, to be in addition to
the distributive share of his interests in legal and equitable estates created in her by Section 74-4-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, or whether she must take either under
the will or the statute, as Section 74-4-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, specifically provides where it does not
appear clearly in the will that its provisions are meant
to be in addition to the statutory share.
In addition to the above issue, this appeal presents
a qnPstion, raised by the executrix on cross-appeal, as to
1

the rate of inheritance tax to be imposed upon the taxable estate pursuant to Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court, on October 4, 1965, pursuant to a
petition (R. 13-15) filed by the executrix for the estate,
heard oral argument in support of and in opposition to
the widow's claim to be entitled to both her distributive
share created by Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, and the bequest in her husband's will, which is set
forth completely in the statement of facts. A :Memorandum Decision (R. 19a) and Order (R. 16-17) ruling for
the executrix were issued. Subsequently, the court considered argument on the second question involved in this
appeal - the proper rates imposed upon the taxable
estate. A second Memorandum Decision (R. 24) followed in connection therewith and finally, on January
20, 1966, a Final Order (R. 29-30), with accompanying
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 25-28), and
an Order amending the previous Order approving the inheritance tax return and fixing inheritance tax (R. 31-32),
·were promulgated by the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This appeal is from the final Order (R. 29-30), and
specifically from the first three numbered paragraphs of
the Order, and those parts of the other documents bearing the same date issued simultaneously therewith, which
reflect the same conclusions set forth in these three numbered paragraphs:
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1. That the testator, William Paxman, intended to
and did provide by his will that his wife, if she survived him, have all of his estate, and without requiring her to relinquish her statutory right to
one-third of the real estate, and that such intention
appears from the will of the deceased.

2. That the surviving wife of said testator had
the right to claim, and receive under the provisions
of Sec. 74-4-3 Utah Code 1953 one-third of real estate described in the Inheritance Tax Return on
file herein, without renouncing the will of said deceased, and also had the right to receive all other
property left by said deceased without relinquishing her right under said statute to claim one-third
of the real estate ref erred to.
3. That the Inheritance Tax Return filed herein
by the executrix of said estate is correct and
should be approved and the exclusion from the
taxable estate in the amount of $12,306.66 claimed
in said return on account of the widow's statutory
one-third interest in real estate should be allowed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 23, 1944, William Paxman, a resident of Juab
County, State of Utah, published his last will and testament. Since this document is very concise, and its exact
wording extremely significant, that document is here set
forth in full:
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, William Paxman, a resident of Nephi,
.Juab County, State of Utah, over the age of twenty-one years and of sound and disposing mind and
memory, and not acting under duress, menace,
3

fraud or undue influence of any person whomso.
ever, and hereby expressly revoking all other and
former wills made by me, do make, publish and
declare this my la.st will and testament, as follows,
to-wit:

1. I hereby give, devise and bequeath unto my
beloved wife, Vivian T. Paxman, all my propert;and estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever
nature or wheresoever situated, to haYe and to
hold the same absolutely.
2. I hereby nominate and appoint my beloved
wife, Vivian T. Paxman, the executrix of this my
last will and testament, and direct that she serve
as such executrix without bond.
3. I hereby declare that my omission to provide herein for my children is intentional and
not occasioned by any accident or mistake, and it
is my desire and will that my children now liYing
and also any of my children which may be born
hereafter shall not share in my estate.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I ha,·e hereunto set my hand this 23rd day of May, A.D., 1944.
/s/ William Paxman
The foregoing instrument, consisting of thi~
one page only, was, at the date thereof, by said
William Paxman, signed, sealed and published as
and declared to be his last will and testament, in
the presence of us, who, at his request and in his
presence and in the presence of each other, have
signed our names as subscribing witnesses thereto.
/s/ Bertha Mc Pherson
Resident: Nephi, Utah
/s/ Joel Taylor
Resident: Xephi, rtah
4
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On November 20, 1964, William Paxman died. No subsequent will or codicil modified the instrument above set
forth.

After the death of the testator, executrix for the
c•state, Vivian T. Paxman, filed a document entitled Acceptance of Testamentary Provisions (R. 4) by which
she purported to claim under the statutory provisions
herein involved in the following language:
The undersigned surviving wife of William
Paxman, deceased, hereby accepts the provisions
of the will of said deceased, but without relinquishment of her right as surviving wife to onethird of all real estate left by said deceased, under
the provisions of Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Ailn.otated, 1953.
The undersigned hereby claims under both the
statute and the will, and contends that it was the
intention of said William Paxman, by his will, to
bequeath and devise to her all of his estate, and
without depriving her of her statutory right to
one-third of his real estate in case she survived
him.
On September 22, 1965, another unusual document
was filed by the executrix for the estate, entitled Petition for Order Approving Inheritance Tax Return and
Fixing Inheritance Tax (R. 13-15). The provision of this
document out of the ordinary was that part thereof petitioning the District Court to pass on the accuracy and
propriety of the inheritance tax return which had been
filed by the executrix with the State Tax Commission,
without giving the Commission the preliminary right to
5

make an initial determination of the appropriateness of
such a return on the basis of its experience and expertise
in this area. Counsel for the Tax Commission in hi~
appearance on October 4, 1965, submitted to the court
that petitioner-executrix had failed to exhaust her ad.
mmistrative remedies and that a Commission review
prior to the court's assuming jurisdiction would he in tlH·
best interests of all.
The court, however, determined to take primary
jurisdiction of the case and decided the case upon ifa
merits, which would appear to be within its authority
under the provisions of Section 59-12-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, even though it is at variance with the administrative pattern of judicial review subsequent to
Commission determination usually adhered to in state
tax cases.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER APPROPRIATE UTAH LA \V, A
WIFE MUST CHOOSE TO TAKE EITHER
HER STATUTORY DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE
UNDER SECTION 74-4-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, OR TO TAKE UNDER THE
TERMS OF HER HUSBAND'S WILL, UNLESS THE HUSBAND EXPRESSLY PROVIDES IN HIS WILL THAT SHE MAY CLAIM
BOTH. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A
CLEAR PROVISION IN THE WILL, THE
ELECTION BY THE WIFE OF ONE IS A
REPUDIATION OF THE OTHER.
Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, crca tes
an interest in a wife in her own right in real property

6

nwne<l hy her husband during the marriage m following term~:

One-third in value of all the legal or equitable
estates in real propert>T possessed by the husband
at any time during the marriage, to which the wife
has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be
set apart as her property in fee simple, if she surviYes him; provided, that the wife shall not be entitled to any interest under the provisions of this
section in any such estate of which the husband
has made a conYeyance when the wife, at the time
0f the conveyance, was not and never had been a
resident of the territory or state of Utah. Property distributed under the provisions secured by
liens for work or labor done or material furnished
exclusively for the improvement of the same, and
except those created for the purchase thereof, and
for taxes levied thereon. The value of such part
of the homestead as may be set aside to the widow
shall be deducted from the distributive share proYided for her in this section. In cases wherein
only th0 heirs, deYisees and legatees of the decedent are interested, the property secured to the
widow by this section may be set off by the court
in due process of administration.
This statute is a substitution for common law dower,
which has been expressly abolished in this jurisdiction
(Section 74-4-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
This problem of whether or not inheritance taxes
apply to dower or comparable statutory property interests receiv<'d by a wife upon the death of her husband has
been of concern in many jurisdictions in this country,
although litigation in the area has been much less extensiye than might be imagined. The explanation for this
7

phenomena lies in the history of inheritance taxation in
the United States.
The first American inheritance tax law was enacted
by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1826, but the tax was
exacted from collateral heirs only, and not the decedent's
direct family. It was not until 1891, in the State of New
York, that an inheritance tax was imposed upon an estatr
or part thereof transmitted to a spouse or child of
the decedent. By 1920, however, this practice was common in virtually every American jurisdiction. Until
1948, the federal inheritance tax law contained provisions
which indirectly benefited an estate when dower or a
comparable statutory interest was not claimed. The
marital deduction, added to the federal tax law in 1948,
terminated this particular benefit, and questions concerning taxation of property passing under statutes such as
ours began to be presented to courts for decision.
In the majority of jurisdictions, including Utah, it
is deemed that a dower type interest, whether common
law or statutory, should not be subjected to an inheritance tax because it doesn't pass from the husband to
the wife at his death but is created in the wife, albeit
inchoate, at the time the property is obtained or at the
time of the marriage, whichever occurs last. In Re
Bullen's Estate, 47 Utah 96, 151 Pac. 533 (1915). Thus
neither an inheritance tax, which is a tax upon the right of
receipt by an heir, devisee, or legatee of property, nor au
estate tax, which is a tax upon the right of transfer of
property from the decedent, will lie in these jurisdictions.

8

The Utah tax is, despite its nomenclature, an estate tax
with some inheritance tax aspects. State Taa; Commission
'" Hackman, 88 Utah 424, 55 P. 2d 171 (1936); Walker
Hank & Trust Co. v. State Tax Commission, 100 Utah 307,
114 P. 2d 1030 (1941).
A minority of jurisdictions, however, have taken a
C'ontrary position and imposed a tax upon a dower interest under varying legal and equitable theories. To impose such a tax is not unconstitutional as a violation of
due process of law. State v. Boney, 156 Ark. 169, 245
s.w. 315 (1922).•
Most authorities seem to feel that equity and the publie interest are served by giving tax benefits in case of
transmission to wife and children, but some suggest that
inequities can arise where a wife may choose between her
statutory interest and a legacy in her husband's will.
Particularly is this true where, as in our jurisdiction,
the husband may designate in his will that the wife may
take both her statutory distributive share and the legacy
he provides for her. This may create a situation where
two wives, equally loved and cared for by their husbands,
might receive through his will the same amount of property, with one getting a substantial tax break over the
other simply because one husband had better legal advice
than the other, and inserted in his will a statement to the
*For a comprehensive and particularly helpful survey of the history of state inheritance taxation of dower and similar interests,
and of the practices of the various states in relation thereto, see
Note, "Inheritance Taxation of Dower and Other Marital Interests," 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 979 (1951).

9

effect that its provisions ·were in addition to the statutory
share under Section 74-4-3.
Even though our statutes make this possible it would
appear to be in the best interests of equity and fairness
in tax administration to limit this to instances where thiR
designation is clearly and unambiguously set forth ill
the will. The provision making possible election by the
widow of either her statutory share or her bequest under
her husband's will is Section 74-4-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads as follo-ws:

If the husband shall make any provision by will
for the widow, such provision shall be deemed to
be in lieu of the distributive share secured by the
next preceding section, unless it shall appear
from the will that the decedent designed the testamentary provisions to be additional to such distributive share, in which case the widow shall be
presumed to have accepted both such testamentary
provisions and such distributive share. If, however, it does not appear from the will that its
provision for the widow is additional, then the
widow shall be conclusively presumed to have renounced such provision and to have accepted her
distributive share, unless within four months
after the admission of the will to pro bate, or within such additional time before distribution as the
court may allow, she shall, by written instrument
filed with the clerk of the court, accept the testamentary provision, which acceptance shall he
construed to be a renunciation of her distributive
share. In the event that the wife shall be insane
or incompetent, or absent from the state, an election shall be made for her by a general guardian.
if she has one, or by a special guardian for the purpose appointed by the court.
10

It should be pointed out that the executrix for the
e,;tate in the instant case is seeking not simply the benefit
of au exclusion of her distributive share from the gross
<':,tnte, hut rather claiming both under the statute and
11rnlN the terms of her husband's will. It is respectfully
submitterl that in the instant frame of reference such a
lienefit is i;wt available to her.

Under the statutory provisions above set forth, the
l111sba11J may designate in his will that the widow take
both her legacy and her distributive share. If, however,
the husband does not clearly manifest this intent and
stnte ''that its provision for the widow is additional
(to the distributive share), then the widow shall be conehrnively presumed to have renounced such provision
arnl to have accepted her distributive share," unless v;ithi11 four months after the will is admitted to probate, she,
hy written instrument filed with the clerk of the court,
accepts the testamentary provision "which acceptance
shall he construed to be a renunciation of her distributive
share."
Thus, unless the husband makes the specific and unambiguous designation in his \vill, made mandatory by
the statute, the a.cceptance under the 'will is a rejection
of the distributive share, and an acceptance of the distrilndire share is a renunciation of the will. The choice
is either/or; a widow cannot "choose" both.
We respectfully submit that this is not a question of
first impression, but that this court has consistently in
11

the past held that the widow is entitled to take either
under the terms of the will or under the statute, but not
both, unless the appropriate language is found in her
husband's will. In Re Osgood's Estate, 52Utah185, 173
Pac. 152 (1918), involved a fact situation similar to the
problem before the court, differing only in that the provisions of the will were much more complicated, and in
the testator's express wish that an election he made. ThP
following language from this case is instructive:
In case, however, the husband makes provision
in his will for his wife, she may then waive or
surrender her rights under section 2826 [74-4-31,
and take under her husband's will. That she may
do that is just as clear from section 2827 [74-4-4],
which we have quoted in full, as it is clear from
section 2826 [74-4-3], that she is entitled to onethird of the value of her husband's real property
regardless of any provision he may make for her
in his will. If, however, the husband makes provision in his will for his widow, and she elects to
waive or to relinquish her right under section 2826
[74-4-3], supra, and elects to take under the will,
she then assumes precisely the same relation to
the husband's estate as any other legatee or devisee under the will. In that event she relinquishes
the right given to her by section 2826 [74-4-3]
just as effectually as though she had conveyed
such right by deed either before or after the death
of her husband. Such is clearly the purport and
effect of sections 2826 [74-4-3] and 2827 [74-4-4]
when read and construed together, as they must
be. In case, therefore, the widow elects to take
under her husband's will, as provided by section
2827 [7 4-4-4], she, of necessity, relinquishes her
right to take under section 2826 [74-4-3], and thus
whatever share she receives from her husband's
12

estate under the will passes to her by such will
and not otherwise. In such event the amount that
she receives from her husband's estate, whatever
it may be, may not be deducted from her husband's estate in computing the inheritance tax ...
52 Utah 193-194. (Emphasis added.)
'L'he court also noted the following:
... That court [New York] has held that when
the widow takes under the husband's will the
whole estate is subject to inheritance tax without any deductions except those specifically provided for by statute. To the mind of the writer
no other conclusion is permissible under the present wording of our statute. 52 Utah 200.
An earlier case, In Re Little's Estate, 22 Utah 204, 61 P.
899 (1900), came to the same conclusions.
A more recent case, In Re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah
17. 187 Pac. 409 (1920), appears to this writer to be con-

trnlling, inasmuch as it cannot be distinguished factually.
1'he testator left five dollars to each of his five children
and the residue and remainder of his estate to his wife.
The court said this, in effect, was a giving of his entire
estate to his wife and that the provisions relating to his
<'hildren were made only to prevent any possible controversy which might arise from omitting his offspring.
The court said, "We must assume that the father was
familiar with our statute relating to wills," and denied
to the estate an exclusion similar to the one Mrs. Paxman
is here seeking, holding:
The statute is clear and explicit. If the husband makes any provision in his will for his
widow, the presumption arises that the provision
so made is in lieu of and not in addition to her
13

statutory share, and this presumption prevails
unless it appears from the will itself that the prnvision was intended to be in addition to h01' statutory share.
In both his memorandum and his argument in the lower
court, counsel for the estate relied heavily upon In Re
Bullen's Estate, supra. This case simply stands for the
proposition that Section 7 4-4-3 creates an independent
property interest in the wife of which she cannot lie dc\prived without her consent. This proposition is not di~'
puted; however, her decision to take under her husbarnl' ~
will is lier consent, is in fact a voluntary rclinq11isl1me11t
of her statutory right. Unless the husband clearly designates that his legacy to her is in addition to and separa1e
from her statutory share, she must abandon her dower
interest to take under the will. This is true whether sl10
is sole heir, whether she inherits with her children, or
whether she is merely one of a number of heirs of diff('l'
ent classes. Had l\frs. Paxman chose to renounce the l'.ill
in this case some of the property in the estate -would ha\'e
gone to the disinherited children under intestate succc:-;sion laws. By claiming under the ·will she gets all of tlw
property, which is consistent with her husband's manifest intent. By claiming to take both under the will aml
by the statute she claims exactly the same property only the inheritance tax ramifications vary.
The Tax Commission has in the past taken the position, consistent with the cases cited above, that unless
the husband-decedent's will clearly designates to tltt'
contrary, an election by the widow to take either l1e 1
14

statutory interest or the legacy under the will is required.
If 1lte widow chooses to take under the ·will, she wai\·es
lier c;tatutory real property interest and such property
is i11clrnlable in the taxable estate. This represents a
<·011tcmporaneons and continuing practical interpretation
lly the Tax Commission, the agency specifically charged
h;- law with enforcement and administration of our rcvrnnc laws. (Section 52-5-46, Utah Code Annotated,
195:)). This interpretation should not be ovcrturne(l
nnless clearly erroneous.
The practice and interpretive regulations by
officers, administrative agencies, departmental
heads and others officially charged with the duty
of administering and enforcing a statute will carry
great weight in determining the operation of a
statute. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction., 516.
See also JVestern Leather & Finding Co. v. State
Taa; Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526 (1935) .
. . . The use of contemporary and practical interpretation makes for certainty in the law and
justifies reliance upon the conduct of public officials. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 513.
rrax practitioners and members of the general public
have come to know and rely upon the Commission's polie;· and practice in this area for many years, have not
challenged the same, and ''like all precedents, where
eontomporaneous and practical interpretation has stood
nnehallcnged for a considerable length of time, it will
hP 1·egarded as of great importance iu arriving at the
proper construction of a statute." 2 Sutherland, Stafu15

tory Construction, 529-521. See also Shockley v. Abbott Supply Co., 50 Del. 510, 135 A. 2d 607 (1957); Dixie
Coaches v. Ramsden, 238 Ala. 285, 190 So. 92 (1939):
Murray Hospital v. Angrove, 92 Mont. 101, 10 P. 2d 577
(1932). Also worthy of note is the fact that the Utah Legislature has acquiesced in this interpretation. Had this
body thought the Commission's interpretation inequitable
or inconsistent with the intent of Sections 74-4-3 and
74-4-4, it would have been an easy matter for it to have
amended the law to require an adjustment of Commission practice. This has not been done, and this legislative acquiescence is implied approval of the Commission's
interpretation and administration. Coudi v. Independent
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 302 P. 2d 117 (Okla. 1956);
State v. Yelle, 52 Wash. 2d 158, 324 P. 2d 247 (1951).
The transmission and inheritance of property is regarded in our Anglo-American legal tradition to be a
privilege and not a right. The sovereign has control over
such property transfers, and can regulate them in just
about any manner deemed in the best interests of the
state and its citizens. The same rules of construction
and interpretation usually applicable to revenue and
taxation laws apply also to inheritance tax laws, including
the rule of strict construction of exemptions in favor of
the taxing power and against the taxpayer. English v.
Crcnsha.w, 120 Tenn. 531, 110 S.W. 211, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.)
753 (1908).

16

This proposition of law is accepted in virtually every
American jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court
}1as spoken as follows in relation thereto:
When exemption is claimed, it must be shown
indubitably to exist. At the outset every presumption is against it. A well-founded doubt is fatal
to the claim. It is only when the claims of the
concession are too explicit to admit fairly of any
other construction that the proposition can be supported. Farrington v. Temiessee, 95 U.S. 679, 24
L. Ed. 558, 560 (1878).
Two leading cases standing for this proposition are
Utah cases. The first, Judge v. Spencer, dealing with
property tax, was decided in 1897. The decision con~ained the following language :
... the court will not aid or enlarge exemptions
by interpretation. The presumption is that all exemptions intended to be granted were granted in
express terms. In such cases the rule of strict
construction applies, and, in order to relieve
any species of property from its due and just proportion of the burdens of the government, the
language relied on, as creating the exemption,
should be so clear as not to admit of reasonable
controversy about its meaning, for all doubts must
be resolved against the exemption. The power to
tax rests upon necessity, and is essential to the
state. Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 249; 48 Pac.
1097, 1099-1100 (1897).
In Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 547, 192 Pac. 272,
275; 12 A.L.R 552, 556 (1920), the court held as follows:
If as to exemption there is doubt, that doubt
will be resolved in favor of taxation. It has been

said taxation is the rule, exemption the exception.
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A leading text authority articulates the concept
fashion:
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thi"

As a. general rule, grants of tax exemptions arr
giYen a rigid interpretation against the assertions of the taxpayer and in fayor of the taxing
power. The basis for the rule here is the samr
as that supporting a rule of strict constrnctio11
of positive revenue laws - that the burden of
taxation should be distributed equally and fairly
among the members of society. 3 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 6702.
See also 2 Cooley, Taxation, Sec. 672 (4th ed. 1924).
Thus, the executrix for the estate has the burden to
show that she is entitled to exemption in this case. This
seems particularly fair since, as earlier pointed ont,
there is an inherent inequity in the statute, which permits one party to get a tax benefit another party in a like
situation is denied merely because of sounder and more
perceptive legal advice. The court should not extend this
inequity by permitting the double exemption to be claimed
in the type of situation here present.

It might be argued in rebuttal to the foregoing that
the Legislature has manifested an intent and a desire to
benefit widows and children of decedents, and a liberal
rather than a strict interpretation here would best further
this legislatiYe policy. The answer to this is that
the grant of the double benefit would require not just a
liberal interpretation but an unwarranted distortion of
the statute. Further, Mrs. Paxman is benefitting sub-
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stautially because she is a surviving widow rather than a
stranger to the blood, even without the relief she is here
seeking. As noted in Point III, she received the full
$40,000 exemption provided for widows and surviving
children. Also, she received a joint tenancy exclusion,
another legislative boon granted only to surviving family
members, in the amount of $23,450.88. Thus, the fact
that slie is the widow of the testator instead of someone not related has created in her favor a totally taxfrre bequest of over $63,000, completely independent of
this problem. The public policy behind dower - the protection of a widow against a thankless, arbitrary husband
- has been well served.

It is thus submitted that it is necessary for a will
to clearly and unequivocally state that its provisions in
favor of a surviving widow are in addition to the interest
ere a ted in her by Section 74-4-3 and Section 74-4-4 if she
is to get the benefit of both the legacy and the statutory
distributive share, and that this requirement is fair and
equitable, both generally and in this particular factual
context. Any doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of the taxing power and against the taxpayer seekiug exemption.

POINT II
THE LANGUAGE IN THE PARTICULAR
vVILL HEREIN INVOLVED DOES NOT PRO\TIDE THAT ITS TESTAMENTARY GRANT
TO l\IRS. PAXMAN IS TO BE CONSIDERED
_ADDITIONAL TO THE \VIFE'S DISTRIBU-
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TIVE SHARE CREATED IN HER BY SECTION 74-4-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
The first point in this brief examined the standard
under which a wife might claim both her statutory distributive share and the bequest left her in her husband's
will. It was therein concluded, and respectfully suggested to the court, that the only time this is possible is when
the will of the decedent husband clearly and without ambiguity designates that the wife is to take her legacy in
addition to her statutory interest. Point II is correlative, and the problem with which it deals is whether or
not the last will and testament executed by William Paxman on May 23, 1944, meets this statutory test. It is submitted that it does not.
The provision in Mr. Paxman's will which provides
for his wife is numbered paragraph 1, and reads as
follows:
1. I hereby give, devise and bequeath unto
my beloved wife, Vivian T. Paxman, all my property and estate, both real and personal, of whatever nature or wheresoever situated, to have and
to hold the same absolutely.
Other provisions of the will appoint his wife to be executrix and set forth his intention to disinherit his children. These have no relevance to the instant question.
On the sole basis of the wording above quoted, it
was urged that William Paxman intended that his grant
20

to his wife be in addition to her distributive share pro,·i<led for in Section 74-4-3. No evidence other than this
will was proffered to support this contention. Indeed,
had there been an offer of such evidence, it would have
h(•eu inadmissible since the statute requires that the intent of the testator be apparent in the will itself.
An examination of the language of the will reveals
110 reference, explicit or implied, to Section 74-4-3 or any
other statute, no reference, explicit or implied, to any
concept that her bequest should be in addition to any
other interest the wife might have in such property or any
other property, no reference, explicit or implied, to dower
or a widow's distributive share in her husband's real
property, no reference, explicit or implied, to inheritance
taxes. Taxation is the only context in which this provision could be meaningful, since under either petitioner's
interpretation or respondent's interpretation of the document, she is entitled to inherit the full property after
taxes. This was Mr. Paxman's evident and primary concern. The language above quoted is simply a general
bequest by the husband to the wife of all of his property,
both realty and personalty, and is couched in extremely
hroad terms. To hold that this meets the statutory test,
that it appears from this language that the husband inte11ded his bequest to be in addition to the widow's statutory distributive share would require the same holding
in relation to just about every broadly-phrased bequest or
.11ra11t in a husband's will in favor of his wife. We submit
1hat this result would be greatly at odds with the manifest
leg·i~·dati,·e intent, and that a clear provision evidencing
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specific intent in the will would be required if the hellCfit here sought is obtained - not just a general expression
suggesting that the testator wanted his wife to have a8
much of his propert!· as possible under the most favorable
terms.
vVe submit, therefore, that this will does not provide·
that its legacy should be in addition to the widow's statutory interest - indeed, it makes no reference or inferenc·e whatsoever to such interest. Therefore, it must be
interpreted under the language of Section 74-4-4 to be in
lieu of and not in addition to the statutory grant, and
au election of one or the other by the wife is mandatory.
Insofar as the lo\ver court held that the will shows the
testator's intent that this bequest be in addition to Mrs.
Paxman 's statutory one-third interest in the husband's
realty, or that it was possible in this case for the widow
to elect to take both her statutory interest and her legacy,
we submit the lower court was in error and should he
reversed.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE APPLICABLE TAX
RATE TO BE APPLIED AGAINST THE
TAXABLE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT,
vVILLIAM PAXMAN, WAS 5% RATHER
THAN 3%.
Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
A tax equal to the sum of the following percentages of the market value of the net estate shall
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be imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of
every decedent, whether a resident or nonresident
of this state:
Three per cent of the amount bv which the net
estate exceeds $10,000 and not to exceed $25,000,
0xcept where property not exceeding in value the
8Um of $40,000 goes to the husband, wife and/or
children of the deceased or anv
. or all of them by.
descent, devise, bequest or transfer directly or
through a trustee, then in such case the exemptions shall be the amount so going not to exceed
$40,000;
Five per cent of the amount by which the net
estate exceeds $25,000 and does not exceed $75,000
except where property not exceeding in value the
sum of $40,000 goes to the husband, wife and/or
children of the deceased or any of or all of them
by descent, devise, bequest or transfer directly
or through a trustee, then in such case the exemption shall be the amount so going not to exceed
$40,000, but on the excess of $40,000 the rate shall
he as herein provided;
Eight per cent of the amount by which the net
estate exceeds $75,000 and does not exceed
$125,000;
rren per cent of the amount by which the net
estate exceeds $125,000; provided, at the discretion of the tax commission, the taxpayer may
f'hoose to pay in kind on an estate or any portion
thereof which is not liquid.
'L1he inheritance tax provided for in this section is a
.~raduated tax, with rates varying according to the size
of tli0 net estate. The net estate is determined hy making- c·ertain specified deductions (debts, property pre-
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viously taxed, tax-free bequests) from the gross estate,
as provided by Section 59-12-7, Utah Code Annotated,
1953. The gross estate, in turn, is computed according
to certain criteria set forth in Section 59-12-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
The initial tax rate provided for in Section 59-12-2
is 3%, and is imposed on that part of the net estate between $10,000 and $25,000 in value. The next bracket,
with a 5% rate, is on that part of a net estate between
$25,000 and $75,000 in value. There is no tax on the first
$10,000 value in any estate; this figure is the basic and
universal exemption. Note, however, that there is provision for a $40,000 exemption in certain circumstances
(where the property in question "goes to the husband,
wife and/or children of the deceased or any or all of
them by descent, devise, bequest or transfer directly or
through a trustee") a;nd that th is $40,000 exemption is
not deducted prior to computing the net or taxable estate, but that the $40,000 amount simply eats up the tax
bracket as set forth in the statute. Since $40,000 is
greater than $25,000, this exemption, where appropriate,
eliminates from tax the entire 3 % bracket and half of the
5% bracket. It follows that whenever the $40,000 exemption is appropriate, the initial tax rate is 5% rather
than 3%.
This conclusion is supported by the expression "but
on the excess of $40,000 the rate shall be as herein provided" at the end of the paragraph providing the 5%
rate. This is an express statutory statement that the
24

G7o rate shall apply to that part of the estate between

$40,000 and $75,000 in value.

'I'hat this is to be interpreted in the context of this
paragraph alone is certainly evident, since a clause of
this type appears in this paragraph alone, and no similar
language may be found in the paragraphs providing for
the 3%, 8% or 10% tax brackets. This is reasonable,
siHce the 5% bracket is the only bracket requiring adjustment where a $40,000 exemption is claimed. Indeed,
t hi' re is no other explanation which would justify the
in!'lusion of this language at this precise point in the
statute.
Any doubt that the legislative intent behind this
section is as submitted above must be eliminated by
a consideration of In Re Wal ton's Estate, 115 Utah 160,
203 P. 2d 393 (1949). The Walton case considered a
number of questions in relation to the interpretation of
Sertion 59-12-2. Most of them are not relevant to the instant problem; one of them, however, is. In discussing
the exemption appropriate to the Walton estate, and what
effect such exemptions would have on the sections herein
clrscribed, the court said:
The first sentence of the second paragraph of
Section 80-12-2, as amended, imposes 3% tax on
that part of the net estate that exceeds $10,000 and
does not exceed $25,000. But, the paragraph continues, if the property goes to certain specified
people - "husband, ·wife and/or children" the
"exemptions" are as high as $40,000 if that
amount of property so passes.
It seems clear that as the first tax to be imposed upon any part of an estate is the 3% of that
25

over $10,000 and not to exceed $25,000, there is at
least $10,000 exempt in all cases. Starting with
this premise, it is reasonable to say that what the
legislature had in mind was: In case of the specified heirs, they have an exemption as high as
$40,000 if the property going to them equals that
amount. Assuming a net estate of $24,000, if thr
property going to them is only $100, the general
exemption of $10,000 applies and the 37o tax iR
on all above that $10,000. If the property going
to them is $15,000, a 3 % tax is payable upon the
difference between the $15,000 and the $24,000.
If in a larger estate the property going to them is
$26,000 there is no 3% tax due, but the 5% tax is
payable upon the property in excess of $26,000 an<l
not exceeding $75,000. If they receive property of
$41,000 valuation, $40,000 is exernpt and 5% payable on all in excess of $40,000 but not exceeding
$75,000. (Emphasis supplied.)
A concurring opinion in this case by the esteemed former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, James H. Wolfe,
is perhaps even more explicit. He wrote '' ... if the property passing to the heirs designated by the statute exceeded $40,000, up to the amount of $75,000, the tax on
the $35,000 or any part thereof would be as provided on
the general scale of $25,000 to $75,000 or 5%." He then
illustrated the mathematical ramifications of the bracket
system in chart form.
The Tax Commission in its interpretation of Section
59-12-2 has for many decades been consistent with thr
Walt on case and the procedure and concepts set forth
herein, whenever a $40,000 exemption is claimed in all
estate totaling more than $40,000 in value; since the \Va 126

tou case, this procedure has not been challenged, in so
far as this office has been able to determine, and it has
certainly never been successfully challenged.

The comments and arguments set forth earlier in
this brief about the force and effect of a long standing
ndminiRtrative practice and interpretation apply with
equal force here as in Point I. The same is true in relation to the duty of a taxpayer asserting an exemption to
prove that he is entitled thereto, and the presumption
existing against exemption in favor of the taxing authority, which have also been previously discussed.
In way of illustration, it may be of value to the court
to set forth representative computations under Section
59-12-2. We will presume a net estate valued at $100,000.
The first computation illustrates the tax that would be
properly imposed if only the $10,000 exemption were
appropriate:
$
0
$10,000
$25,000
$75,000

- $ 10,000 ________________________________ Exempt
- $ 25,000 at 3% ------------------------ $450
- $ 75,000 at 5% ------------------------$2500
- $100,000 at 8% ________________________ $2000
Total Tax ______________________________________ $4950

This second computation shows tax due when the estate is eligible for the $40,000 exemption:
$
0
$10,000
$25,000
$40,000
$7f5,000

- $ 10,000 ________________________________ Exempt
- $ 25,000 ________________________________ Exempt
- $ 40,000 ________________________________ Exempt
- $ 75,000 at 5% ________________________ $1750
- $100,000 at 8% ________________________ $2000
Total Tax ------------------------------------$3750
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Thus, the Legislature created a real benefit and conceR
sion in favor of those who leave their property, consistent
with statutory directive, to their spouses and children.
On the sample estate above set forth a $1200 tax saving
is effected - should the decedent leave all of his property
to others than his immediate family, an inheritance tax of
$4950 would be due instead of a tax of only $3750, which
would be appropriate had family members been his heirs.
Counsel for petitioner contended in a memorandum submitted to the lower court that the Tax Commission's and
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 59-12-2 in the
Walton case would ''put the direct heirs of the decedent
in a disadvantageous position compared with collateral
heirs" and favor "collateral heirs or strangers" over
"surviving spouses or children." The fallacy of thi~
contention is clearly demonstrated by the computations
set forth above.
It is clear, of course, that if the position of counsel
for the executrix is sustained in face of the Walt on decision, the Tax Commission's long standing interpretation, and the decision of the lower court on this point, an
even greater benefit would accrue to the spouses and
children involved. The appropriate computation in this
case would be as follows:

$

$ 10,000 --------------------------------Exempt
- $ 25,000 --------------------------------Exempt
- $ 40,000 --------------------------------Exempt
- $ 55,000 at 3 % ........................ $45ll
- $100,000 at 5% ··········-·-···········$2250
Total Tax ·-------······-··-····················$270

0 -

$10,000
$25,000
$40,000
$55,000
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It is respectfully submitted, however, that the Legislature clearly never intended that the computation
should be made in this manner, and that such a eomputat ion vwuld be at odds with both the spirit and the exprPss \\'Ording of Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated,
1!Jfi3.

CONCLUSION
Sections 74-4-3 and 74-4-4, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, require, unless the husband's will clearly designates
to the contrary, that an election be made by the widow to
take either under the terms of the will or acc.ept her
8tatutory distributive share. The will in the instant case
does not so designate, and the State Tax Commission
respectfully urges reversal of that part of the lower
court's decision which states or implies that the will does
t>o provide, or that the widow is entitled to take both under
the statute and the will .. It is prayed that that part of
the court's decision dealing with inheritance tax rates,
from which a cross-appeal has been taken by respondent
in this case, be affirmed. It is further submitted that
there are compelling and controlling case precedents
wliich support both of these points in this jurisdiction,
and that the best interests of the state of Utah and its
ritizens would be served by re-affirming the conclusions
nnd principles set forth in these cases.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
Attorney for Appella;nt
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